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Abstract 
Lipsky’s seminal concept of street-level bureaucrats (SLB) focuses on their role as public 
servants. However, in the course of new modes of governance, private actors have gained an 
additional role as implementation agents. We explore the logic of private SLBs during the 
implementation of the Swiss Ordinance on Veterinary Medicinal Products (OVMP) where 
veterinarians are simultaneously implementing agents, policy addressees, and professionals 
with economic interests. We argue that, because of contradictory reference systems, it is 
problematic for the output performance if an actor is simultaneously the target group of a 
policy and its implementing agent. 
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Street-level bureaucrats within new modes of governance 
The subtitle of Michael Lipsky’s (1980) seminal book on street-level bureaucrats (SLB) refers 
to the “dilemmas of the individual in public services”. Clearly, this was an apt description of 
the intersection between policy delivery and policy target group in the 1970s. Meanwhile, the 
division of labour between state and society has fundamentally changed and became much 
more hybrid (Bevir 2012). Many public policies are implemented in cooperation with private 
actors or are even fully outsourced to private actors (Knill and Tosun 2012), but the 
consequences of such new modes of governance for street-level bureaucracy have received 
little scholarly attention.  
In this paper, we explore whether and in what ways it matters for the implementation of 
public policies if the implementing agents are public bureaucrats or private actors who 
themselves are adressees of a given policy. More specifically, we discuss three aspects of 
SLBs in new modes of governance: First, it has become unclear who the SLBs actually are. 
We argue that private actors can act as SLBs in hybrid modes of governance. Second, we 
analyze the consequences for output delivery with regard to differences in the SLBs’ 
performance, conceived as their compliance with the output targets set out by the policy 
(Hupe and Hill 2007: 294). Third, the reasons for such differences are discussed. Since public 
and private agents have different goal orientations (Peters 2011), we expect this to be 
reflected in their decisions at the street level. 
The complexity which prevails between actors in hybrid implementation structures implies 
that it takes a specific analytical focus on the interactions and power relationships of SLB 
with their reference groups (Lipsky 1980: 54 ff). Implementing agents take on roles created 
by the interplay with their environment, and these roles generate requirements for behavior 
which can lead to role conflicts and dilemmas (Lipsky 1980) affecting the agents’ willingness 
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to implement a given policy (Tummers et al. 2012). In our quest to understand the 
implications of new modes of governance for output delivery, we seek to apply and 
eventually extend, rather than replace, the basic ideas of street-level bureaucracy. 
We will do this with the example of the veterinary drug regulation in Switzerland. The 
national Swiss Ordinance on Veterinary Medicinal Products (OVMP) regulates the supply 
with and the use of veterinary drugs for livestock. Within the OVMP’s control system for the 
correct administration of veterinary drugs, the role of the SLB is shared between the public 
servants, i.e. the regional (cantonal) veterinary services, and the private veterinarians, i.e. the 
first target group of the policy. The private veterinarians have a control function vis-à-vis the 
farmers in their usage of veterinary drugs. This creates a double role because the private 
veterinarians have to control their own customers.  
We discuss the theoretical basics of such double roles of private SLBs in the next section 
before we present the implementation arrangement of the OVMP and derive two hypotheses 
regarding output delivery and its causes. We then present empirical findings from a survey 
that was done in the course of the evaluation of the OVMP (Sager et al. 2012). Finally, we 
discuss how hybrid forms of implementation affect the output performance of SLBs and what 
theoretical implications we can derive thereof.  
 
Public and private street-level bureaucrats 
Public governance is defined as “regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative 
practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and 
services through formal and informal relationships with third parties in the public and private 
sector" (Robicheau and Lynn 2009: 22). The last forty years “have seen the roll-out of the 
public sector reforms that are commonly associated with a shift from government to 
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governance. There has been a shift from bureaucratic hierarchy to markets and networks. [...] 
The identity and role of public servants has changed to emphasize these tasks” (Bevir 2012: 
1).  
The collaboration between the public and private sector under new modes of governance also 
implies that private actors increasingly take over tasks related to the implementation of 
policies (Knill and Tosun 2012: 151, 200ff). However, the state remains responsible and has 
typically focused on increasingly regulating private actors to safeguard the public interest 
(Pierre and Peters 2000; Sager 2009; Sager and Rielle 2013). Private actors might implement 
rules in a rather light-handed way if the threat of public enforcement is low (Baldwin et al. 
2011: 35, 58). Effective monitoring crucially creates incentives for target groups to comply 
with policies (Winter 2003: 220). From a regulatory perspective, it is therefore relevant to ask 
how private actors behave when implementing public policies.  
Our first argument has been overlooked by Lipsky (1980): Private actors who are involved in 
the implementation of public policies also act as street-level bureaucrats. In the bottom-up 
implementation arrangements of new modes of governance, the empowerment of private 
actors to become more active in monitoring and delivering public tasks (Winter 2003: 213f.) 
essentially transforms private actors into SLBs (Smith 2003: 358). The term "bureaucrat" in 
this context refers not to employment in the public administration, but to an actor’s function 
as implementing agent, i.e. his involvement in the (traditionally public) task of output delivery 
at the frontline. 
Public policy implementation can be seen as a principal-agent relationship, i.e. a linear 
exercise of tasks through mandated actors (Moe 1984; Sager and Rüefli 2005: 103; Winter 
2000). When a central public actor delegates public tasks to private actors, the accordant 
patterns of relationships and delegation processes of principal-agent relations apply. In 
exchange for fulfilling their tasks, private actors receive discretional power in enforcing 
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public policies. Similar to principal-agent approaches, the SLB approach stresses the 
discretionary decisions of street-level workers when delivering a policy to individual citizens 
(Lipsky 1980: 13). This discretionary role makes SLBs essential actors in implementing 
public policies. Given this assertion, we ask the question whether new modes of governance 
have implications with regard to the results and processes of output delivery. 
Stoker (1998) argues that, while new forms of governance are ultimately concerned with 
creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action, its outputs are supposedly no 
different from those of government. Accordingly, Richards and Smith (2002: 279, emphasis 
in the original) state that it "is not what the state does that is different, but how he does it." 
Thus, it makes a difference whether SLB are public or private actors and under what rule they 
act to explain how they act, but not for the output they ultimately produce.  
As to the processes of output delivery, Smith et al. (2011: 3) state that the „problems of 
implementation have been magnified by a shift from hierarchy to networks and market forms 
of delivery.” These problems can best be understood with Lipsky’s (1980: xii) argument “that 
the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they 
invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies 
they carry out.” The core determinant for output delivery is thus the situation in which the 
implementing agent is acting.  
Hill (2009: 145) contrasts two viewpoints on SLBs: SLBs as ‘bad guys’ who “break rules, … 
disobey their superiors [, and] use whatever discretion they have to advance their own 
interest”, and SLBs as ‘good guys’ who “adapt rules to real needs, […] who are sensitive to 
the needs of the public they serve [, and] who use whatever discretion they have to advance 
service ideals”. In a complex form of interdependence of various actors, the point of reference 
needed for such a normative judgement of SLBs is lost. 
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The individual dilemmas of SLBs stem from their need to decide how to deal with their 
discretion (Lipsky 1980). “The essence of street-level bureaucracies is that they require 
people to make decisions […]. Street-level bureaucrats have discretion because the nature of 
service provision calls for human judgment” (Lipsky 1980: 161). There are two ways how to 
legitimise the use of this discretion beyond rules: professional values and the target audience 
of the policy. SLBs “see themselves as professionals. Lipsky (1980: 147) describes SLBs as 
governed by ‘occupational or professional’ ideologies.” (Hupe and Hill 2007: 282). The first 
reference group for this role understanding thus lies in the wider circle of professionals. The 
second reference group is the clientele. Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003: 20) write that 
SLBs “in their narratives … define their work and to a large extent themselves in terms of 
relationships more than rules.”  
From this finding, Hupe and Hill (2007: 283) conclude that “despite differences in their 
formal positions […] street-level bureaucrats are public officials. As public actors acting in 
the public domain, they are held publicly accountable for the results of their work.” However, 
this definition of SLBs as public officials in their interaction with individual citizens does not 
fully apply if policy tasks are delegated to private actors. The role of the implementing agent 
is even more questionable if the target group of the policy is at the same time the customer of 
this private SLB. In the next section, we will present such a problematic double role of SLBs: 
the implementation structure of the OVMP.  
 
The implementation structure imposed by the Swiss Ordinance on 
Veterinary Medicinal Products (OVMP) 
At the turn of the millenium, several animal diseases have shed light on issues of food safety. 
As a consequence, the use of veterinary drugs has gained increased regulatory importance. 
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Since 2004, the OVMP regulates the dispensing and use of veterinary drugs for livestock. It 
aims at ensuring the professional use of veterinary drugs, preventing residues of drugs in food 
of animal origin, and the protection of animals. As to its policy addressees, veterinarians are 
responsible for prescribing and supplying (dispensing) veterinary drugs, whereas the livestock 
owners often apply (administer) the drugs to the animals themselves. The OVMP regulates 
the type, the amount, and the storage of drugs that may be given to which animals, under what 
circumstances, and by whom.  
Within the decentralised structure of federal Switzerland, the implementation of the OVMP 
takes place at the cantonal level. The official controls of compliance with the OVMP, are 
done by means of on-site inspections by inspectors of the 26 cantonal veterinary offices 
(cantonal public veterinarians) both in veterinarians’ practices and on farms. These controls 
would have to take place every five years in veterinary practices, and (until 2012) only every 
ten years on farms. 
The monitoring of the compliance of farmers with the OVMP is partially consigned to the 
private veterinarians. The OVMP allows for written agreements between veterinarians and 
livestock owners which combine liberal dispensing rules with veterinarians' biannual visits on 
the farms. During these visits, the veterinarians also check the farmers’ documentations of the 
use of veterinary drugs, and the storage of the products. Many veterinary drugs are given to 
the animals via the feed. The fabrication of such medicated feedingstuffs by farmers on the 
agricultural site must be supervised by a specially trained veterinarian (FTVP). The farmer 
concludes a written agreement with an FTVP, who then gives detailed instructions and 
supervises on site the processes of blending, feeding, and cleaning the technical facilities. The 
FTVP is legally responsible for ensuring famers’ compliance with the OVMP's regulations. 
The private veterinarians have a practical relevance in ensuring compliance with the OVMP: 
they much more regularly control farmers than official inspectors do (whereas the latter 
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control the veterinarians on a more regular basis than they control the farmers). This 
decentralised, two-fold, and semi-private implementation structure of the OVMP 
(summarized in table 1) is a system of regulated self-governance characterized by hierarchical 
intervention through legally binding rules, accompanied by cooperative relationships between 
public and private actors during the implementation of public policies (Knill and Lenschow 
2003). Clearly formalized and institutionalized procedures delegate competencies of policy 
implementation to private actors (Knill and Tosun 2012: 210f.).1 We can therefore distinguish 
public SLBs, i.e. the public veterinarians, and private SLBs, i.e. the private veterinarians. 
Both are SLBs with discretional power and part of the implementation arrangement of the 
same overarching policy. These different types of SLBs can be compared regarding their 
contribution to the output targets of the OVMP. 
 
-- Table 1 about here – 
 
The question of the political control of street-level bureaucrats is particularly salient in federal 
systems. Structures that align the interests of implementing agents with policy making 
principals aim at enhancing implementation by intermediaries (May 2003: 224, 229f; Meyers 
and Vorsanger 2003: 245f). Even though the number of inspections is an action readily 
subject to control (Winter 2000) regulatory oversight can be considered as low, and sanctions 
as absent, with regard to both the public and the private veterinarians’ duties as implementing 
agents. The official controls of the private veterinarians focus on their role as policy 
addressees dispensing veterinary drugs, rather than on their role as implementing agents, i.e. 
                                                 
1 As opposed to organizations or networks or other forms of semi-private or societal actors. 
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they way in which they monitor the farmers. The OVMP attributes legal means of action to 
the public veterinarians, ranging from monetary fines, additional inspections and enactments 
to penal sanctions (Sager et al. 2012: 35), but the use of penalties against the private SLBs is 
uncommon. As to federal oversight, the Federal Veterinary Office (FVO) collects the cantonal 
data concerning the inspections on farms (frequency and results) in the Informationssystem 
für den öffentlichen Veterinärdienst (ISVET), but there is no national database for the official 
controls of the private veterinarians, and no further national enforcement of the control duties 
of the public veterinarians. 
The expansion of the government’s partnership with private suppliers has changed the role of 
government as being no longer the producer of goods and services (Kettl 1993). Hence, the 
role of public vs. private ownership for the delivery of professionalized public services (e.g. 
Bøgh Andersen and Blegvad 2006) has received more scholarly attention than the delegation 
of control tasks. Since the latter does not entail a change of ownership of assets –there are no 
assets to be owned -, patterns of ownership cannot account for differences in output delivery 
of public and private agents. Rather, we now seek to show how the involvement of private 
actors into policy implementation increases the complexity of relations in the implementation 
arrangement, creates double roles and the potential for conflicting interests. 
 
The output performance of public and private street-level bureaucrats 
The basic argument of the SLB framework is that SLBs make a difference for output 
performance. It is a well-known assertion that public and private actors may diverge in their 
understandings of a “good” output: whereas the public governance mode focuses on public 
service objectives, private agents rather have efficiency and results in mind (Considine and 
Lewis 2003). Nonetheless, our first hypothesis follows Stoker’s (1998) assumption that the 
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main differences of governance modes of implementation lie in the processes of policy 
implementation rather than in the produced output, if conceived as meeting the objectives of 
the policy.  
 
H1: There are no differences with regard to the level of output performance between public 
SLBs and private SLBs. 
 
As for the roles of SLBs in the processes of output delivery, we can assume significant 
differences between private and public actors (cf. Hill 2009). Hybrid governance modes 
present “may involve actors with different goals and different values about the policy 
problems they are addressing” (Peters 2011: 81). Private actors have an inherent interest in 
profits and customers (Considine and Lewis 2003) which may be difficult to reconcile with 
the public interest (Goodsell 2003; Lieberherr 2012). However, as implementing agents, 
private actors serve a public goal. The literature on legitimacy often asserts a balancing effect 
of mixed governance modes by combining the different public and private elements (Bevir 
2012). By contrast, we expect that these divergent values will be reflected in the 
implementation process.  
The goal orientations mentioned above may alter the power relationships, whose importance 
has long been emphasized by the sociology of organizations, between the SLBs and their 
reference groups. Especially in highly complex settings, “[…] the process of power and 
decision making […] is an intersecting, zig-zagging process particularly conducive to 
shunning responsibilities” (Crozier and Thoenig 1976: 553). The SLBs have to find a 
complex equilibrium between different kinds of loyalties, their commitment to professional 
values, and their reference group orientations (Gouldner 1957: 290).  
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Whereas public SLBs are caught between rules and professional values, private SLBs may be 
caught between professional values and their customers’ interests. Public SLBs are also “user-
oriented”, but Lipsky (1980: 54-7) assumes that the public SLBs’ clients are not his primary 
reference group as they are “nonvoluntary”. However, when a business relation with the 
clientele exists, the dependence of private SLBs upon their clients (who transform to 
customers) can be expected to be much higher than that of public SLBs upon their clientele. 
Contrary to what is theorized for public SLBs, the clientele could hold the private SLB 
accountable in such a scenario and therefore, participatory accountability could become 
predominant even in “performance” modes of implementation (Hupe and Hill 2007). Thus, 
the private SLB could refer more to the clientele in his decisions than to the rules he is bound 
to. Additionally, the private SLBs may have difficulties to reconcile the goal orientations of 
their “private” role as veterinarian in a market situation with those of their “public” role as 
implementing agents. In summary, the delegation of implementation tasks to private actors 
may confront the latter with conflicts of roles (Tummers et al. 2012) and interests (economic 
dependencies being one possible cause). In their complex interplay rather than in isolation, 
these factors may affect the delivery of output. Accordingly, we formulate a second 
hypothesis concerning implementation deficits: 
 
H2: Due to divergent goal orientations and role conflicts, implementation deficits of public 
SLBs have different reasons than those of private SLBs.  
 
Research design, data and methods 
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We rely on data gathered during the formative evaluation of the OVMP in early 2012. Semi-
structured telephone interviews were conducted with cantonal public veterinarians (N = 22),2 
representatives of the cantonal (N = 24) and national (N = 11) agricultural producers’ 
associations, producers of medicated feedingstuffs (N = 6), experts in animal health (N = 8), 
retailers (N = 4) and inspectors (N = 5) of food products, and national regulators (N = 3). An 
online questionnaire was sent to all Swiss private veterinarians (N = 373, response rate 25%). 
Information about the results of inspections by public veterinarians on farms in 2010 was 
available through ISVET.  
First, we compare the SLBs’ delivery of inspections and sanctions, and control results, with 
the statutory provisions. The output performances of the two groups of actors are then 
compared. Second, we qualitatively assess the causes in terms of differences in the 
relationships of private and public veterinarians with their respective reference groups, and 
the incentives for implementation and tensions between diverging interests created thereby.  
Our data do not lend themselves to regression analyses or inferential statistics. We lack 
information about the criteria upon which the farms included in the ISVET data were selected 
for inspections, but the former are likely to differ between the cantons. Because neither the 
controlled farms nor the cantons represent a random sample, conclusions about the population 
cannot be drawn and we refrain from calculating p-values for the differences between the 
variables. Considering their methodological limitations, the data are analyzed by means of 
descriptive statistics to illustrate and support our qualitative argumentation in an indicative 
way (Diekmann 2005: 357ff, 555ff). However, our theoretical conclusions are primarily based 
on qualitative information gained from the in-depth interviews and document analysis. 
                                                 
2 The cantons Uri, Schwyz, Nid- and Obwalden, as well as Appenzell Innerrhoden and Ausserrhoden, share one 
public veterinarian. Zug did not participate in the interviews, but Liechtenstein is subject to the OVMP and 
treated as a “canton” henceforth. 
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Public and private veterinarians as street-level bureaucrats 
SLBs adapt policies due to the uncertainties and pressures they have to cope with, the routines 
developed and individual decisions taken during implementation (Lipsky 1980: 161). Thus, 
we should not only observe deviations from the OVMP’s output goals, but also individual 
differences between the different, both public and private, implementing actors. 
The output performance of the public veterinarians entails the implementation of controls in 
veterinarians’ dispensaries and farms, and the imposing of sanctions. The public veterinarians 
should inspect 20 per cent of the veterinarians’ dispensaries every year. Since there is no 
database for these inspections, no systematic picture of the compliance of the public 
veterinarians with these requirements of the OVMP exists apart from their own declarations 
about their control and sanction activities, which are unreliable, not available for all cantons, 
and limited in their comparability.  
 
-- Table 2 about here – 
 
The available information indicates that the target of 20 per cent of is met by many, but not by 
all cantons (table 2, second column), and that there are quite notable differences between the 
cantons concerning their output performance. Furthermore, the ISVET data reveals a clear 
implementation failure with regard to the inspections on farms (table 2, third column). 
Whereas ten per cent of all farms should be inspected every year, only 5.8 per cent of the 
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Swiss livestock farms were actually controlled. 3 There is substantial variation in the output 
performance of the different cantonal public veterinarians.  
According to the interviewees, the main reason for this implementation failure is the lack of 
money and personnel provided by the cantons. However, only a minority (seven out of 22) of 
the public veterinarians complained about lacking resources. The available resources are not 
consistently related to output performance (table 2; Eta = 0.248). Even though cantons with 
sufficient resources do tend to perform better, there must be an additional explanation for the 
lacking output performance of public veterinarians in the field of inspections. 
 
--Table 3 about here – 
 
The results of official inspections, i.e. the evaluations by cantonal veterinarians of the 
farmers’ compliance with the different checkpoints (source: ISVET), reveal d striking 
discrepancies between cantons (table 3). These deviances mirror different interpretations of 
the OVMP’s rules by the public veterinarians. To put it in Lipsky’s (1980: 51) words: 
“Agency-generated statistics are likely to tell us little about the phenomena they purport to 
reflect, but a great deal about the agency behavior that produced the statistics.” 
Similarly, there are large cantonal differences in the use of santions by public veterinarians in 
the case of infringements (table 6 appendix). For example, some public veterinarians never 
charge the costs of inspections on the clients, whereas others routinely do so. Some think that 
„sanctions lead to nothing anyway“, whereas others urge for even more penalties.  
                                                 
3 From 2004 to 2010, only 6.24 per cent of Swiss livestock farms have been checked on average (ISVET). There 
are no substantial differences between years,. 
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The output performance of private veterinarians concerns the realization of biannual visits 
within written agreement and the implementation of their duties as FTVP. There is no official 
statistics of the implementation behavior of private veterinarians, but the ISVET (table 4) 
indicates that mostfarmers have concluded at least one written agreement with a veterinarian. 
Yet, the biannual visits as central duty within such an agreement are only carried out in half of 
the cases. Futhermore, in more than fifty per cent of the instances of on-farm manufacture 
(OFM) of medicated feedingstuffs, private veterinarians dispensed the drugs to the farmers 
even though no written agreement with an FTVP existed (which would be required). 
Furthermore, even if an FTVP was supposedly present on site, his or her instructions were 
often not followed. These data indicate that a great part of the private veterinarians 
substantially neglect their obligation to ensure the compliance of farmers with the OVMP’s 
regulations. 
 
-- Table 4 about here --  
 
Accordingly, our respondentsreport significant differences between veterinarians concerning 
their task fulfillment as FTVP. Together with the fact that, despite their specialised education, 
most FTVP lack knowledge of the technical properties of the OFM facilities, this leads to the 
wide-spread perception that the private veterinarians are usually not able or willing to assume 
their responsibilities as FTVP.  
Many private veterinarians, but also a notable share of agricultural producers and public 
veterinarians, doubt the usefulness of written agreements, and even more so, of the biannual 
visits (figure 1). These results show that public and private veterinarians use their discretion 
during the implementation of the OVMP. As Lipsky (1980) expects, there are systematic 
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differences in the ways in which the output is effectively delivered. 
 
-- Figure 1 about here – 
 
Following Stoker (1998), we should not observe systematic differences between the 
(deficiency of) output performance of private and public SLBs. Policy addressees judge both 
public and private veterinarians to comply with the regulations to roughly the same extent, 
which, however, considerably exceeds the degree of compliance detected in the ISVET 
dataset (figure 2). 
 
-- Figure 2 about here – 
 
Clearly, implementation failures exist both with public and with private veterinarians but are 
more severe with the latter (table 4). The targets of the OVMP are also not met for the official 
inspections of farms, but much less for official inspections of the veterinarians’ dispensaries 
(table 2). Thus, there are indeed differences in the output performance of private and public 
veterinarians which do not support the first hypothesis. The results rather indicate that private 
governance might lead to worse outputs than public governance. 
 
Explaining output performances 
Smith et al. (2011) argue that implementation problems are more severe within private 
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implementation structures. Because SLBs define themselves largely in terms of relationships 
(Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003), we focus on the respective reference groups of private 
and public veterinarians when assessing our second hypothesis.  
 
The relationship between public and private veterinarians 
Why are private veterinarians not always controlled and sanctioned as required by the public 
veterinarians? Public veterinarians are somewhat reluctant to exert authority on private 
veterinarians. First, they depend on the collaboration of the latter in enforcing the OVMP. The 
public veterinarians need to ensure the willingness of the private veterinarians to cooperate in 
making the farmers comply with the OVMP’s regulations. Second, the public veterinarians 
used to be private veterinarians themselves and are professionally and personally interlinked 
with their former colleagues. Interviewees stressed that these mechanisms are weaker when 
the inspections of veterinarians’ dispensaries are outsourced to an external, independent 
veterinary office, as done by eleven cantons (Sager et al 2012: 25).  
Interviewees also pointed out that, when inspecting the livestock farms, the cantonal officials 
are checking whether the veterinarian in charge is doing his/her job correctly. The farmers’ 
compliance with the OVMP largely depends on the collaboration with their veterinarian. If a 
public veterinarian censures and/or sanctions a farmer, it often also requires a change in 
behavior of the private veterinarian in charge. Thus, the argument made above that public 
veterinarians avoid enforcing the OVMP to maintain a good relationship with the private 
veterinarians should also hold for the official inspections on farms. This means that the 
regulatory oversight on the private SLBs is, indirectly, even further weakened by the OVMP’s 
two-fold implementation structure. 
The different roles of public and private veterinarians and the incentives for policy 
18 
enforcement, the consequential dilemmas and double roles are illustrated in figure 3. When 
public veterinarians enforce the OVMP, they should control and sanction the private 
veterinarians as policy addressees, but, simultaneously, they depend largely on their 
cooperation as „colleagues“ (Hill 2009). The private veterinarians are therefore the primary 
reference group of public veterinarians.  
The double role of private veterinarians as policy addressees and implementing actors alters 
their relationship with the public agent. The public-private implementation structure limits the 
possibilities of public agents to effectively treat the private implementing actors as target 
group. When using his discretionary power, the public SLB trades off the enforcement of the 
policy vis-a-vis this first target group against the enforcement of the policy vis-a-vis the 
second target group. In line with Smith et al. (2011), the resulting dilemma is created by the 
shift to hybrid forms of implementation: There would not be a problem if the private 
veterinarians were only clients and not at the same time implementing agents. 
 
-- Figure 3 about here -- 
 
The distinction between professional reference group and clientele is far from clear-cut here:, 
the relationship between the two groups is not only affected by the private veterinarians’ 
capacity as policy addressees, but also as a professional reference group for the public SLB. 
This second double role of the private agents further complicates the dilemma for the public 
SLB and impairs his output performance. As expected in our second hypothesis, both 
dilemmas created by the double roles lead to a conflict between the public SLB’s professional 
values and the need to comply with the OVMP’s rules.  
19 
 
The relationship between private veterinarians and livestock owners 
Why are the farmers so poorly controlled? The key feature to understand the relationship 
between the farmers and private veterinarians is that the farmers are not only the 
veterinarians’ target group, but also their main source of income. The private veterinarians are 
not primarily implementing agents, but service providers and as such, dependent on the 
farmers. Interviewees have stressed how important it is for the private veterinarians not to 
annoy their customers.  
The regulations of the OVMP are of minor importance to the farmers and mainly perceived as 
a burden restricting their freedom of action (see table 5). Most of them clearly prefer 
collaborating with a veterinarian who does not emphasize compliance too much. Some 
livestock owners exert significant pressure on veterinarians to stretch the regulations to their 
own favor, e.g. by dispensing high amounts of antibiotics. The biannual visits are very 
unpopular amongst livestock owners: Half of them do not recognise their usefulness (figure 
1), nor that of the supervision by FTVP during OFM.  
Logically, the easiest way for veterinarians to avoid a loss of customers is if they can bypass 
unfavorable provisions without having it discovered. An effective enforcement of the 
OVMP’s regulations is a potential threat to the veterinarians' business. This is reflected in the 
veterinarians' general perception that the OVMP is too restrictive (table 5). Note that usually 
the same veterinarian with whom the written agreement is concluded, who thus sells the 
drugs, also takes over the function as FTVP, i.e. is supposed to ensure the correctness of the 
process. Moreover, private veterinarians are locally rooted, and a reputation of being „strict“ 
could potentially alienate other customers. In sum, private veterinarians have a significant 
economic interest in not carrying out their duties as implementing agents, and the 
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interdependencies created by the business relationship have the potential to aggravate this 
effect. This illustrates how the SLB’s relation with the target group is complicated and gains 
importance, and a conflict of interest prevails, because the former is private and not public. 
 
-- Table 5 about here -- 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the different roles of private veterinarians in their relationship with 
livestock owners, the incentives they create for policy enforcement, the resulting dilemmas 
and double roles. The private veterinarians as SLBs mainly refer to the target group: the 
livestock owners. When enacting their duties imposed by the OVMP, they have a double role 
because they are simultaneously implementing agents and providers of services. These two 
roles create contrasting incentives which are difficult to reconcile. As providers of services, 
the private veterinarians are economically dependent upon their customers, which limits their 
scope of action to effectively enforce the policy vis-a-vis the target group. Our analysis shows 
that economic motivations outweigh the responsibility as implementing agents for many 
private SLBs. 4 
 
-- Figure 4 about here -- 
  
                                                 
4 We focus on economic aspects because they are a particularly revealing feature of the implementation 
arrangement. However, other factors affect the private veterinarians’ output performance; for instance, they 
share a sense of being field actors with the farmers and they feel they know best what the relevant field measures 
are. 
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This is an effect which is particular to cooperative forms of implementation. Only in the 
private sector can the target group of a policy simultaneously be the customer of the SLB. 
Contrary to the public SLBs and in accordance with our expecations, it is not the professional 
values as implementing agents which shape the private SLBs' use of discretion beyond the 
rules (Lipsky 1980), but the economic aspect of the business relationship with the target 
group.  
 
Conclusion: The triple double role of private SLBs  
The case of the twofold public-private implementation structure of the OVMP illustrates that 
there are two types of SLBs in times of new modes of governance: public and private 
implementing agents, a fact hitherto neglected in the literature. The type of SLB makes a 
difference for output delivery: contrary to Stoker’s (1998) assumption, the outputs of private 
implementing agents are different from, and slightly worse than, those of government. This 
roots in divergent goal orientations of public and private actors (Lieberherr 2012; Peters 
2011), reflected in different relationships of the two types of SLB with their reference groups.  
Conforming to Smith el al.’s (2011) expectations, the complexity of relations in new modes of 
governance has created multiple, and conflicting, roles for the private SLBs (Tummers et al. 
2012). Figure 5 summarizes how private veterinarians as private SLBs have three functions 
and double roles: they are simultaneously implementing agents, policy addressees, and 
professionals. This, in turn, leads to additional dilemmas for, and negatively affects the output 
delivery of, both public and private SLBs in the case of the OVMP. 
 
-- Figure 5 about here -- 
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The fact that the private veterinarians are simultaneously a target population of the policy and 
implementing agents restricts the possibilities of the public SLBs to effectively hold them 
accountable and enforce the regulations. This dilemma is reinforced because the private 
agents are both clientele and a professional reference group for the public agents. The public 
SLB finds himself caught between rules and professional values. In our example, the diverse 
double roles reinforce the lack of oversight over the output performance of the private 
veterinarians. 
The latter, in turn, is shaped by the private SLBs’ double role as “public” implementing 
agents and “private” providers of services. This creates a dilemma where economic interests 
often impede the effective enforcement of the OVMP. The private SLBs’ reference group 
when deciding about the use of discretion is both clientele and their main source of income. 
Consequently, the power relationship is altered and one of Lipsky’s main assertions about 
public SLBs might need to be reconsidered for private SLBs, namely that “clients are not a 
primary reference group of street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky 1980: 47, emphasis in the 
original). If the clients can indeed withdraw from encounters with the private SLBs, and the 
latter depend on the former, the clients are in a position to discipline the private SLBs. 5 When 
the clientele holds the private SLBs accountable, Hupe and Hill’s (2007: 294) assumption that 
participatory accountability is not predominant in “performance” modes of implementation 
may not be accurate in private implementation settings. This highlights the importance of 
economic interests in the relationship between private SLBs and their reference group in 
times of hybrid implementation. 
                                                 
5 This kind of dynamic is described by Lipsky (1980: 56) using the example of doctors which become much 
more solicitous when patients have medical alternatives on which to draw.  
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Our case study shows that it can be problematic if an actor is simultaneously target group of a 
policy and implementing agent. It also suggests that a private provider of services may not 
always be interested in enforcing a public policy vis-à-vis their customers, e.g. due to 
economic dependencies - a factor which is particular to private forms of implementation.6 
This is not to say that the involvement of the private sector in the implementation of public 
policies inescapably impairs policy outputs. However, we argue that the increased complexity 
of interrelations between actors in new modes of governance can have an effect on output 
performance. In particular, regulators should take into account the fact that private 
implementing agents equally act as SLBs. This implies the possibility that “the exercise of 
street-level discretion with minimal accountability gives workers undue power over the […] 
enforcement of obligations […], introducing their own biases” (Meyers and Vorsanger 2003: 
249). Hence, ensuring adequate output performance requires a careful assessment of the 
incentives created by the implementation arrangement (May 2003). Our analysis supports 
Baldwin et al.’s (2011) assertion that in the absence of a real threat of public enforcement, 
private agents may use their discretion as SLBs to pursue their private, instead of the public, 
interest. Discretion is inherent to street-level work, but private SLBs can face conflicts 
between the interests they have in their private role and, in their public role, which stem from 
the increased complexity and alterations of the SLB’s relationships with their reference 
groups. If the private SLB’s output behavior is not directly controlled, the limits on the 
political control over SLBs are exacerbated when tasks are delegated to the private sector 
(Winter 2000).  
In order to understand whether and how implementation arrangements impact policy outputs, 
we suggest a systematic analysis of the relationships of the implementing actors with their 
                                                 
6 We do not preclude the possibility that the introduction of market principles in the vein of New Public 
Management reforms may have similar effects. 
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reference groups (clientele and professional). Considering the insights of organizational 
sociology on the importance of power relationships (Crozier and Thoenig 1976; Parsons 
1956), this entails, first, an evaluation of the different roles taken by the actors concerned by 
the policy, and second, the identification of the implementing agents’ respective reference 
groups. For each role, the relationship with the reference group should be analyzed with a 
specific focus on the impetus it creates for the implementation of the policy. This facilitates 
the identification of eventual multiple roles and/or conflicting interests which could create 
dilemmas for the implementing agents. We believe that such a consequent application of the 
analytical tools laid out by Lipsky (1980) provides a powerful instrument to gain a clearer 
understanding of the impact of implementation structures on individual behavior. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Implementation structure of the OVMP 
Policy addressees inspected Controlling actor (SLB) Frequency of inspections 
Every 5 years 
2x a year 
As FTVP: every fabrication 
of MFS  
Control arrangement of the OVMP. 
FTVP: Fachtechnisch verantwortliche Person, (suitably qualified person). 
MFS: Medicated feedingstuffs. 
SLB: Street-level bureaucrat. 
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Table 2: Implementation of inspections by cantonal public veterinarians 
Canton1 % of 
veterinarians‘ 
dispensaries 
controlled per 
year2 
Required by 
OVMP: 20 
Number of 
farms3 
% of farms 
controlled in 
20103 
Required by 
OVMP: 10 
Sufficient 
resources for 
inspections 
available?4 
Outsourcing of 
the controls of 
veterinarians 
to accredited 
inspection 
body?4 
1 -- 4342 4.8 Yes Yes 
2 -- 1814 6.5 Yes Yes 
3 -- 864 8.9 Yes Yes 
4 20 -- -- Yes Yes 
5 20 12950 4.1 No No 
6 20 3865 3.3 No No 
7 20 441 1.6 Yes No 
8 18 525 8.4 No Yes 
9 -- 3120 4.9 Yes Yes 
10 -- 1319 7.1 No No 
11 -- 6053 8.7 No No 
12 20 896 10.4 Yes Yes 
13 -- 4122 9.1 Yes Yes 
14 20 511 5.1 Yes Yes 
15 22.2 5468 5.4 Yes No 
16 20 1405 6.3 Yes Yes 
17 20 706 5.4 -- -- 
18 -- 4445 1.6 No Yes 
19 16.7 4142 3.6 No No 
20 20 2578 6.1 Yes No 
21 10 673 7.3 -- No 
22 -- 3236 9.9 Yes No 
1The names of cantons are not displayed to ensure the respondents’ anonymity. 
2Source: Authors‘ own calculation according to self-indications by public veterinarians. Limited validity and 
comparability of data. 
3Source: ISVET. 
4Source: Self-indications by public veterinarians. 
-- No indications. 
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Table 3: Results of official inspections of farms: cantonal differences 
Checkpoint  CH1 Range2 Median2  IQR2  Dispersion3 
Drugs are not correctly stored 4.9 19.8 0 0.0-4.3 5 
No additional label with correct 
indications exists 
15.6 47.1 7.1 4.6-15.9 6; 6 
The administration of drugs is 
not documented 
11.8 27.3 7.4 2.3-16.6 6; 6  
The documentation of 
administration is not complete 
13.2 27.4 5.7 3.5-16.7 5; 5 
No written inventory exists 21.7 66.7 20.5 9.8-29.7 5; 5 
Documentations are not stored 
during 3 years 
9.7 39.1 6.2 1.5-11.4 5; 5 
No written instructions for 
administration exist 
11.9 58.8 7 2.6-14.5 6; 6 
Source: ISVET.  22 veterinary offices. CH = Switzerland. IQR = interquartile range. 
1% of controlled farms in Switzerland. 
2% of controlled farms in cantons. Number of farms per canton see table 2. 
3Italics: Number of cantons above third quartile; others: below first quartile. 
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Table 4: Output performance of private veterinarians 
Checkpoint  CH1 Range2 Median2  IQR2  Dispersion3 
No formally correct written 
agreement exists 
15.9 36.8 14.4 4.7-22.9 6; 6 
Biannual visits are not carried 
out 
50.1 100 48.2 28.6-66.9 6; 6 
In case of OFM: No written 
agreement with FTVP exists 
55.7 100 33.3 0.0-60.0 5 
In case of OFM: Instructions of 
FTVP were not followed 
49.1 100 0.0 0.0-54.6 5 
Source: ISVET.  22 veterinary offices. CH = Switzerland. IQR = interquartile range. 
OFM = On-farm manufacturing of medicated feedingstuffs.  FTVP = Fachtechnisch verantwortliche Person. 
1% of controlled farms in Switzerland. 
2% of controlled farms in cantons. Number of farms per canton see table 2. 
3Italics: Number of cantons above third quartile; others: below first quartile. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Perceived degree of regulation by OVMP 
The degree of 
regulation by the 
OVMP is… 
Private veterinarians 
N = 372 
Public veterinarians 
N = 22  
Agricultural 
producers’ 
representatives 
N = 35 
Too high 79 50 60 
Accurate  11.6 30 37.1 
Too low 5.4 20 2.9 
No answer 4 0 0 
Source: Sager et al. 2012.  Results in % of interviewees. 
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Table 6: Sanctions due to infringements of OVMP, 2009-2012 
Canton1 % of controlled farms sanctioned  Number of sanctions against private 
veterinarians 
1 0.8 0 
2 -- 0 
3 0 0 
4 0 2 
5 9.5 1 
6 26.2 0 
7 20 36 
8 10 0 
9 20 0 
10 -- 18 
11 7.5 3 
12 17.7 12 
13 15.4 5 
14 16.8 3 
15 5.6 0 
16 -- 2 
17 0 -- 
1The names of cantons are not displayed to ensure the respondents’ anonymity. No indications for 5 out of 22 
veterinary offices. 
Limited validity and comparability of data. 
-- No indications. 
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Figure 1: Judgement of usefulness of regulations by policy addressees
 
Source: Sager et al. 2012.  Results in % of interviewees. 
Questions: What is your judgement of the usefulness of the written agreements which enable veterinarians to 
dispense veterinary drugs without a prior personal clinical assessment on site / of the visits on site which must be 
carried out twice a year by the veterinarian if such an agreement exists? 
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Figure 2: Judgement of compliance of private and public veterinarians with the OVMP by 
policy addressees 
 
Source: Sager et al. 2012.  Results in % of interviewees. 
Questions: In your opinion, have the private / public veterinarians changed their behavior as required by the 
regulations of the OVMP since it has been issued by 2004? 
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Figure 3: Roles and dilemmas in the relationship between public and private veterinarians 
 
Source: Authors’ own illustration. 
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Figure 4: Roles and dilemmas in the relationship between private veterinarians and farmers 
 
Source: Authors’ own illustration. 
 
Figure 5: Functions and double roles of private SLB
 
Source: Authors’ own illustration.    
